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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: IAS PART 39

------------------------------------------x

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
MICHAEL QUARTARARO,
Index No. 45734/92

Petitioner,

'

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
- against THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF
PAROLE, RAUL RUSSI, Chairman,
Respondent.

------------------------------------------x
KRISTIN BOOTH GLEN, J.:

Petitioner Michael Quartararo ("Quartararo") was convicted in
1990 for the murder of John Pius, aged 13.

He brings this Article ·-

78 proceeding seeking to reverse the determination of the Parole
Board's Appeals Unit which affirmed the Parole Board's denial of
his application for parole.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

John Pius was killed in 1979 for allegedly witnessing the
theft of an all-but-worthless motor bike by Quartararo, then aged
14,

his brother Peter,

Robert

aged 15, · and two other teen-aged boys,

Brensic and Thomas Ryan.

John Pius suffered a

severe

beating, although his death was actually caused by several small
stones

which

were

forced

down

his

throat,

resulting

in

his

traumatic asphyxiation, all,- allegedly, 1n an attempt to ensure his

(

silence.

His body was found the day after his death hastily

shrouded with logs,

leaves

and sticks in the yard behind the

Dogwood Elementary School in Smithtown, New York.
Quartararo was tried and originally convicted of the second

'

degree murder of John Pius in 1981.

He was sentenced as a juvenile

offender to an indeterminate sentence of 9 years to life.

Peter

Quartararo, whose several confessions to the murder had implicated
his brother, as well as Ryan and Brensic, was tried jointly with
Quartararo, with the same result.

Ryan and Brensic were convicted

of the murder in separate trials.
Quartararo entered the New York State Division for Y~uth, at
Masten Park Secure Center in Buffalo, in 1981.

He remained there

until he turned 21, on January· 14, 1986, when he was transferred
to the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS").
Petitioner brought a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court
and was granted a new trial in 1988, after having served nearly
seven years of his term, on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Quartararo v Fogg., 679 F. Supp. 212 (EDNY, 1988) aff'd.

849 F2d 1467 (2nd Cir. 1988).

Among the reasons for overturning

the conviction on ineffective assistance grounds was petitioner's
counsel's failure to object to the District Attorney's summation,
in which he used photographs of the victim to improperly incite the
jury.

Quartararo v Fogg, 679 F. Supp. at 243.
2

'

Peter Quartararo' s

conviction was also overturned,

grounds that his confession
in

one

session)

inadmissible.

was

on the

(actually several confessions given

obtained

illegally,

Quartararo v Montello,

and

715 F.

1989) aff'd, 888 F2d 126i(2nd Cir. 1989).

was,

Supp.

therefore,
449,

(EDNY,

The District Court took

notice of the fact that the Temporary Commission of Investigation
of the state of New York, in its investigation of the practices of
the

Suffolk

Department,

County
found

District

Attorney's

Office

and

Police

that the Suffolk County Police deliberately

violated the United states constitution and New York state laws and
that their behavior was "characteristic of conduct long tolerated
by responsible officials of the Suffolk County Police Department
and the District Attorney's Office."

715 F.Supp. at 466.

See

also, Report of the Temporary Commission of Investigation of the
State of New York dated April 1989 {Appendix B to Petitioner's
Memorandum of Law).

The convictions of both Ryan and Brensic have

also been reversed, as a result of the inadmissibility of Peter
Quartararo's confession.

People v Brensic,

70 NY2d 9

(1987);

People v Ryan, 134 AD2d 300 (2nd Dept. 1987).
In People v Brensic, the Court of Appeals held that Peter
Quartararo' s

confession could not

be admitted against

Brensic

because circumstances indicated it was unreliable as a matter of
law.

The court, criticizing the interrogation of Peter
3

(

Quartararo observed:
... [e]vidence before the court not only failed
to establish the reliability of Peter's
[Brensic's co-defendant, Peter Quartararo)
confession, it suggested quite the contrary,
that he had a strong motive to fabricate when
he confessed to his mother.

'

Given this substantial evidence that the
confession was but one of several, each
containing material differences, that it was
obtained from
a
juvenile after
lengthy
custodial questioning and that it was given
under circumstances which suggest that it was
induced
by
the
hope
of
leniency,
the
confession should not have been placed before
this jury, as evidence.
p 21.·

Petitioner was released on bail pending his new trial, which
took place . in March of

1990.

Once more tried as

a

juvenile

offender, Quartararo was again found guilty of the second degree
murder

of John Pius,

confession.
maximum

despite the absence

of

the

inadmissible

He was returned to prison to serve, as before, the

available term of 9 years to life.

The sentencing judge

offered his recommendation that Quartararo not be afforded parole
until he had served a minimum of 15 years, inclusive of the time
already served.

An appeal of the second conviction is pending.

Apparently, prison life offered to Quartararo some measure of
direction or meaning which he otherwise lacked,

because,

upon

entering the State Division for Youth, and continuing thereafter,
4

petitioner

has

amassed

an

impressive

educational credits and accolades.

array

of

vocations,

He has completed his Bachelor

of Science degree, magna cum laude, and continues to take courses
in a number of fields, including law.

He has trained as a printer,

managed the Wallkill Correctional Facility law library, and,)most
recently,

participated in DOC's Temporary Release Work Program,

wherein he maintained a full time job as a printer, his chosen
vocation.

During his two years out on bail awaiting his new trial

Quartararo was employed, attended college, and met and married his
wife, Patricia, the mother of two children.

Throughout the years

since his indictment, and up until the present time, Quartararo has
steadfastly maintained his innocence in the death of John Pius.
Quartararo first became eligible for parole in 1992 following
completion

of

9

years

of

incarceration.

Parole

was

immediately after a hearing held on February 11, 1992.
hearing,

the

Board

reviewed with

petitioner

his

denied

During the

sentence

and

institutional history, his accomplishments and positive adjustment
during incarceration, his participation in work release, his habeas
corpus petition and second conviction, the circumstances of the
murder, the fact that he

has a new wife and step-children, the

arrangements for living and working if released, and the status of
his second conviction on appeal.

In addition, the Board members

referred to Peter Quartararo' s suppressed confession stating "Peter
5

i

was discharged because they suppressed the confession from him, but
the first time he told stories." [Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") p 12
Exhibit 7 to Petition.]

[Tr. p 12).

The Board also acknowledged

that it could not fairly consider the stories in the press about
him

but

noted

tl\at:

there

is

a

"clouding of

the

issues"

in

petitioner's case by press articles; "press articles just muddy
the waters;" "big crimes make big headlines and make big noise" and
by stating:
Your own attorney, he made statements that he
would like to take back probably now, you know
about growing up - - that was just throwing
gasoline on the fire.
[Tr. p 19 ].
A

Board

member

also

speculated,

on

the

record,

as

to

the

appropriate punishment for this type of crime.
The Parole Board's determination,

placed on the record by

Commissioner Burke immediately after petitioner left the hearing
room,

was denial of parole with reconsideration in twenty-four

months.

The grounds for the denial include consideration of the

brutality

of

the

crime,

the

seriousness

of

the

offense,

recommendation of the sentencing judge, severity of the sentence
issued to Quartararo, which was the maximum sentence applicable to
him as a juvenile offender, and the fact that he had been convicted
by

two

juries.

The

Board

exemplary prison record,

of

Parole

and th~ many
6

noted

the

letters of

petitioner's
support and

recommendation submitted on his behalf, while also noting the many
letters

from

prosecutors,

opposing release.

the

judge

the

victim's

family

The Board also took note that Quartararo "has

consistently denied the offense. 11
despite

and

Quartararo' s

The Board determined that,

institutional performance 'land

performance

while out on bail," his release at this time is incompatible with
the welfare of society, would deprecate the seriousness of this
crime and undermine respect for the law."

The decision of the

Board was upheld by the New York state Division of Parole Appeals
Unit on August 20, 1992.

Quartararo may next appear for a hearing

on the issue of parole in February 199~.
DISCUSSION

Quartararo maintains that he is a fit candidate for parole,
that the denial of parole was a

violation of his due process

rights, and of applicable statutes, and was arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion.
Quartararo first complains of his summary suspension from the
work release program shortly before his parole hearing, allegedly
as a result of an unsubstantiated and uninvestigated charge that
petitioner

had

made

a

threatening

concerning John Pius' mother.

remark

to

another

prisoner

The remark was allegedly relayed to

the Parole Board by the District Attorney, who has been quite vocal
in his disapproval of Quartararo's participation in work release.
7

Quartararo's suspension from work release is, allegedly,

also a

result of inflammatory reports in the press concerning Quartararo' s
participation in the program.

Petitioner also claims to have been

unfairly singled out for surveillance and harassment as a result
of ttle public outcry surrounding his participation in the work
release

program.

All

of

these

factors

are

alleged

to

have

improperly influenced the Parole Board's decision.
Further,

petitioner

claims

that

the

Board

made

use

of

illegally obtained evidence in reaching its determination, in the
form of Peter Quartararo's suppressed confession;

made use of

materials improperly placed in his parole file; 1 relied improperly
on the "vindictive" sentence given to petitioner by the sentencing
judge; applied the wrong guidelines to Quartararo's case by failing
to apply its own "juvenile offender" guidelines; overlooked the
achievements

of

the

petitioner;

and

gave

undue

weight

to

petitioner's continuing refusal to express remorse for his role in
the death of John Pius.
Respondents, in defense of the Parole Board's determination,
1

Pursuant to CPLR §7804(c) petitioner's counsel requested
that the parole file be made available to me for in camera
inspection to determine whether it contained any materials which
were inappropriately placed before the Parole Board for review.
Respondent did not oppose submitting the file for in camera review
and assured me that no inappropriate materials were contained in
it.
The file was reviewed and the results of the review will be
addressed infra.
8

argue that Peter Quartararo's confession and press reports were
not relied upon; that the sentencing judges' s recommendation is not
vindictive

and

the

Parole

Board

properly

considered

the

recommendation as a factor; that petitioner's court imposed minimum
sentence exceeded the juvenile offend"er parole guidelines rendering
them inapplicable, and that generally the determination was made
in accordance with statutory guidelines and therefore not subject
to review.
REVIEW OF PAROLE BOARD DETERMINATION
Standard - Generally

Before considering t?e specific bases for challenge to the
Parole Board's determination first the standard of review must be
considered.

Because

a

person's

rightful

extinguished upon his or her conviction,
constitutional right to parole.

liberty

interest

is

there is no inherent

Matter of Russo v New York State

Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73 (1980).

In this state a convicted

person has no guarantee that he or she will be considered for
parole at any particular time,
holds

out

id. at 75.
no

more

than

"The system is thus

discretionary

and

the

possibility

of

parole," id.

So long as the Board exercises its discretion in

accordance with the state's statutory guidelines, no violation of
due process can be claimed.

Id. at 75-76; see also, People ex rel.

Herbert v New York State Board of Parole, 97 AD2d 128 (1st Dept.
9

(

1983).
Since the decisions of the Board of Parole are discretionary,
they are not subject to judicial review if made in accordance with
statutory requirements.

Executive Law §259-1[5]; Matter of,Davis

v New York State Division of Parole, 114 AD2d 412 (2nd Dept. 1985);
Matter of Ristau v Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 (3rd Dept. 1984), appeal
den.

63 NY2d 608 (1984).

The presumption is that the Board has

properly complied with its statutory duty, Matter of Davis v New
York State Division of Parole, supra at p 412.
only

obtain

reversal

of

the

Board's

The p~titioner can

decision

by

making

a

"convincing showing" that either the Board did not consider the
required factors, or considered erroneous information in reaching
its decision, Matter of Abrams v New York State Board of Parole,
88 AD2d 951 (2nd Dept. 1982), see also, Monroe v Thigpen, 932 F.2d
1437

(11th

bordering

Cir.
on

1991),

and

impropriety"

only
will

a

showing

serve

intervention in the Board's determinations.

to

of

"irrationality

warrant

judicial

Matter of Russo, supra

at p 79.
There
discretion

are
of

some
the

limitations

Parole Board.

on

the

Although,

nearly

unreviewable

unlike the parole

systems in Nebraska, see, Greenholtz v Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
USl (1978) and Montana, see, Board of Pardons v Allen, 482 US 369
( 1987) ,

New York's parole provisions do not establish a scheme
10

'

whereby parole is mandated unless specific conditions require its
denial, Boothe v Hammock,
boards

605 F.2d 661 (2nd Cir. 1979), 2 parole

cannot deny parole for discriminatory reasons,

Potter,

631 F.2d 233

Parole,

489

F.2d

1980), Farries v U.S. Board of

(3rd Cir.

948

17th Cir.

"flagrant or unauthorized actions,"
1441.

Block v

1973),

nor

may

it

engage

in

Monroe v Thigpen, supra at p

Where a denial of a privilege is contrary to state practice

it can constitute a denial of the right to due process.
(7th Cir.

1978)

cert.

v Rowe,

579 F.2d 1365

(1979).

Parole decisions, like all other forms of state action,

cannot be based on impermissible purposes.

den.

See, Durso
439 US 1121

Brandon v District of

Columbia Board of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (DC Cir. 1984), cert. den.
469 US 1127 (1985).

Thus although there is no constitutional right

to parole in New York the Parole Board must make its determinations
in accordance with Executive Law §259-i.
Statutory Requirements

Under

the

consider several

statutory
factors,

requirements

the

Board

including the inmate's

is

bound

to

institutional

record and record of accomplishments, his or her performance in a
temporary release program,

and the inmate's plans for release.

2

As petitioner's counsel points out, there may be room for
reconsideration of Boothe v Hammock, supra, in light of Board of
Pardons v Allen.
It is not necessary to reach the issue here,
however, in order to decide this Article 78 proceeding.
11

Executive Law §259-i[2][c]; 9 NYCRR 8002.3(a).

Where the inmate's

minimum period of incarceration has been set by the Court, rather
than previously, by the Board, consideration must also be given to
such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the type and length
of

sentence,

the

recommendations

of

the

sentencing bourt

and

prosecuting attorney, as well as those of the inmate's attorney and
the

pre-sentencing

criminal

record.

Consideration

of

probation

report,

Executive

Law

statements

and

the

§259-i[2][c];

provided

weight

is

another.

to

prior

§259-i[l][a].

by the closest

relative of a deceased victim is also required.
§259-i[2][c)[v).

inmate's

surviving

Executive Law

The statutory scheme does ~ot specify how much

be accorded to

any given

factor

in relation to

McKee v New York State Board of Parole, 157 AD2d 944, 945

(3rd Dept. 1990).
Role and Duty of Parole Board

The

question here

is

how to

evaluate the

Parole

Board's

determination, in light of the broad discretion given to the Board
by the legislature, the insulation from judicial review where the
determinations are made in accordance with statutory requirements,
and taking into account the presumption that the Board has complied
with its statutory duty.

The Appellate Division, First Department

in Matter of King v New York State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423
(1st Dept. 1993), leave to appeal granted 82 NY2d 746 (1993) has
12

(

recently addressed what constitutes the duty of the Board when
making parole decisions pursuant to Executive Law §259-i (sub.2).
as:
[ i) t is unquestionably the duty of the
Board to give fair consideration to each of
th'e applicable statutory factors as to every
person who comes before it, and where the
record convincingly demonstrates that the
Board did in fact fail to consider the proper
standards the courts must intervene.
id. p 431.

The prisoner in King was serving a sentence of twenty years
to life for felony murder in connection with the murder of an offduty police officer.

The District Attorney conceded, post-trial,

that King had not been the shooter.
record

in prison.

At

the

Parole

King also had an exemplary
Board hearing,

held

Commissioners Gerald M. Burke, Maria Buchanan and Thomas

w.

before
Biddle,

Commissioner Burke made extensive comments on the record about what
the appropriate penalty is for murder in today's society.

In

particular, he speculated about whether a life sentence without
parole or the death penalty would be a more appropriate punishment.
The Appellate Division held that the Parole Board's denial of
King's application was a result of the failure to weigh all of the
pertinent considerations.

Among its criticisms was the fact that

the record implied the Board's decision was a foregone conclusion.
The Court noted:
13

(

... Commissioner Burke's extensive remarks at
the hearing demonstrate that the Board was
proceeding on the assumption that its primary
duty was to determine, in the abstract, the
appropriate penalty for murder in today's
society.
It is, in fact, difficult to
avoid the inference that Commissioner Burke
felt some regret that petitioner had not been
executed, thereby eliminating the dilemma
caused by his rehabilitation, and that he
considered petitioner's rehabilitation to be
a dilemma for the very reason that he believed
that petitioner should not be eligible for
parole.
Since neither the death penalty nor
the imprisonment without the possibility of
parole are part of the law of this state, they
should clearly not have entered into the
Board's consideration.
Id. p 432.
The

Parole

establishing

Board

penal

had

policy

misconstrued
by

its

role,

resentencing. King,

in

effect

rather

than

.determining whether he should be released based on the statutory
factors.

Id. p 432.

In the parole determination at bar,

as in King,

there is

strikingly similar evidence that the Parole Board misconstrued its
role.

It is worth noting that petitioner's Parole Board hearing

was held three days before King's, and was in front of the same
three commissioners.

Comments made at the hearing by Commissioner

Burke indicate that he similarly misconstrued his role with regard
to petitioner's parole application.

He stated:

We don't really have the wisdom to know how
much is enough. I do it all the time, by the
way, because that is the business I'm in.
14

But, it is not written on tablets, for sure,
we will talk it over and we will make a
decision, and we are going to make it in your
case. . ..
How high is up?
How much is enough for
murder? How much is enough for murder if you
are sixteen, how much if you are eighteen, how
much if you are fourteen? . . . . If, the victim
is twelve, eight, nine, thirty, what do you
do; is it more?

Society doesn't have the answer to the death
penalty,
non-death
penalty.
Juvenile
off enders who committed the act were held
accountable as if they were adults.
Society
is ever changing its position, it is like a
pendulum swinging back and forth.
We have
much more death penalty now than we had ten
years ago . . . . So there is no answer to the
philosophical question.
[Tr. pp 21-22]
Here, as in King, Commissioner-Burke was resentencing rather than
following the statutory guidelines.
Another similarity to the King hearing was that as soon as
petitioner left the room Commissioner Burke immediately announced
denial of the parole application, apparently without conferring
first with the other two Commissioners, [Tr. p 24], confirming the
impression that the determination was a foregone conclusion prior
to

the

hearing.

For

these

reasons,

I

find

that

the

Board

misconstrued its role and prejudged this parole application and
therefore its determination to deny parole must be set aside and
a de novo hearing held.
15

Since the Board must hold a hearing de novo, I now consider
petitioner I s remaining claims to determine if other errors were
made, in order to avoid their repetition.
Good Behavior

Petitioner

claims

that

t'he

Parole

Board

overlooked

his

achievements in rendering its determination.

Apart from my finding

that the Board misconstrued its role and,

as discussed infra,

considered information it should not have, the transcript of the
hearing itself establishes that the Board did consider Quartararo's
record of achievements.

The inmate's commendable behavior carries

no greater weight than that of other factors, however, see, People
ex rel. Herbert v New York State Board of Parole, supra at 133.
In

addition,

Executive

Law

§259-i[2][c]

specifies

that,

"[d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined."

It requires that the Board consider, "if there is a

reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to undermine
respect

for

the

law,"

id.;

9 NYCRR §8002 .1 (a) .

There

is no

evidence in the hearing record or in the parole file to suggest
that

petitioner's

accomplishments
16

and

excellent

institutional

record,
that at

in particular, were not taken into account.

One trusts

least the same attention will be paid at the de nova

hearing.
Faiiure to Admit Crime

Petitioner contends that the Parole Board's reliance on His
silence with regard to his role in the murder is a violation of his
rights.

I

assertion,

note

preliminarily

that,

contrary

to petitioner's

despite the fact that he has elected to appeal his

conviction, the conviction stands until and unless it is reversed
on appeal.
The record clearly shows the Board's dissati!:!faction . with
Quartararo' s unwillingness to express any personal remorse over the
death of John Pius, in light of the Board's obviously firm belief
in his guilt.

There is no impropriety here, as was found in the

case of Paz v Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Englewood
Colorado, 787 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1986) to which Quartararo refers.
In that case the Commission, assessing an inmate's right to
parole, made an actual finding that he had committed a crime for
which he had never been charged, much less convicted.

The court

specifically recognized the Commission's right to consider "an
offender's inability to accept responsibility for the wrongfulness
of

his

conduct"

in

finding

that

an

inmate

had

not

been

rehabilitated, but felt the Commission's determination to make the
inmate confess to further crimes to be improper.

17

Id.__ at_473.

In

the present matter the Board made no similar, improper finding, and
did not err in considering as a mark against him Quartararo's lack
of remorse for the serious crime of which he had been convicted.
Sentencing Judge's Recommendation

Petitioner alsh objects to the Board's consideration of the
sentencing judge's recommendation that he serve 15 years on his
sentence

of

nine

years

to

life.

A

sentencing

judges's

recommendation is one of the factors to be considered by parole
authorities, Executive Law Section 259-i(l) (a); Matter of Jorge v
Hammock, 84 AD2d 362 (3rd Dept. 1982).

Quartararo argues that the

15 year ~ecommendation is an increase over the first sentencing
judge's sentence of nine years to life, the maximum sentence, with
no added recommendation about how long he should serve.
Quartararo claims that the judge's recommendation of a 15 year
minimum sentence to be served prior to parole,

amounts

to an

"enhanced" sentence as a result of a second trial and conviction,
which raises a "presumption of vindictiveness" and unfairness in
the court's sentencing.

See, North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711

(1969); People v Van Pelt, 76 NY2d 156 (1990).
In the present case Quartararo received the identical sentence
after both convictions.

Whether the Appellate Division will find

a "presumption of vindictiveness" in such a case, where the judge's
parole recommendation was made simultaneously with the sentencing,
18

awaits

the

conviction.

determination

of

Quartararo's

appeal

from

the

This is not a matter appropriately raised here, since

it amounts to a collateral attack on the judgment of the sentencing
court.

It is sufficient to note that the Board had a duty to

consider the sentencing court's recommendation, givlng it whatever
weight it felt the recommendation deserved, and that the Board did
so.

Juvenile Offender Guidelines

Nor

is

the

Board's

alleged

failure

to

refer

internal Juvenile Offender Guidelines improper.

to

its

own

The Board is not

required to set forth reasons for devia~ing from its guidelines
when denying parole.
Parole, 88 AD2d 951
internal guidelines,

Matter of Abrams v New York State Board of
(2nd Dept. 1982).

In addition, the Board's

while perhaps useful in the case of many

juvenile offenders, are not promulgated according to statute.

Nor

do they appear in the Executive Law or in the regulations contained
in 9 NYCRR 8001.1, et seq., so they do not have the force of law.
See, People ex rel. MacKelvey v New York State Division of Parole,
138 AD2d 549 appeal den., 72 NY2d 802 (1988).
out,

the

minimum

sentence

imposed

by

the

As respondent points
Judge

exceeds

the

guideline maximums such that requiring the Parole Board to consider
the Juvenile Offender Guidelines would be meaningless
situation.
19

in this

Peter Quartararo's suppressed Confession

What is of major concern here is the appearance,

from the

hearing record, that the Board erroneously relied on petitioneris
brotherls suppressed confession and petitioner's first conviction
in its denial of parole.
confession

on

page

12

In particular, reference was made to the
of

the

hearing

transcript:

"Peter was

discharged because they suppressed the confession from him, but the
first time he told stories," the confession that was found by the
Court of Appeals to be unreliable and unconstitutionally obtained
and

suppressed,

proscribes
hearing,

the

as
use

noted
of

infra,

illegally

p

3.

The

seized

exclusionary

evidence

because it is quasi-criminal in nature.

at

a

rule

parole

Piccarillo v

Board of Parole, 48 NY2d 76 (1979) .. Here it is "illegally seized
evidence" which has already been suppressed in a criminal action,
which was apparently used in a parole hearing.

I note also that

there are many sources for the Parole Board to use to find out
about the circumstances of the crime and Quartararo's role in it.
Similarly, the Board's several mentions of petitioner's first
conviction

is

inappropriate.

On

page

26

of

the

transcript,

included in the determination was the following language"··· the
seriousness

of

the

present

offense. . .

· outcome of two jury trials ... ".
20

have

combined

with the

The mention of Peter Quartararo's confession on the record,
which at most had a minor effect on the determination, combined
with reference to the first jury verdict is of concern here because
it

evidences

a

lack

of

appropriately consider.

understanding

of

what

the

Board

may

The contents df an unreliable confession

and the outcome of a trial so defective that the conviction was
reversed on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds,

have no

place in a Parole Board hearing or determination.
Press Reports
There

is

some

evidence

here

that

Parole

Board

members

improperly relied on press a~counts in their review of the parole
application.

Al though the Board members recognized that they could

not fairly consider the statements in the press about Quartararo
{Tr. p 16), one commissioner referred on the record to comments
made by one of Quartararo' s

previous counsel,

which upset the

victim's family {Tr. p 19), and were widely reported in the press,
but were not part of the parole file.

Additional comments were

made by the Board at the hearing such as "There is clouding of the
issues in your case by the press articles ... "

{Tr. p

"[b]ig crimes make big headlines and make big noise."

16)

and

(Tr. p 18).

It is undeniable that the murder of John Pius was brutal and
the feelings in the community are strong.

Extensive press coverage

of the parole status of those convicted of this crime is to be
21

expected

under

these

circumstances.

Nonetheless,

it

inappropriate for the Board to consider public pressure.

is
See,

People ex rel. Howland v Henderson, 54 AD2d 614 (4th Dept. 1976),
cf., Brennan v Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).

The Parole

Board shall not weigh or even mention press reports · or their
contents in the hearing de nova or in any future hearings.
Work Release Revocation

Petitioner states that his participation in work release was
revoked,

a

few

days

before his parole hearing,

after

reports

appeared in the press that the Suffolk County District Attorney was
opposed to Quartararo's involvement in that program.

He further

alleges that the revocation was improperly considered by the Parole
Board.

In opposition respondent states:
[Department of Correctional Services'] DOCS'
work release programs are in no way operated
or influenced by parole and the Parole Board
has no connection or affiliation with the work
release.
Moreover,
Commissioner
Burke
specifically acknowledged Parole's letter to
petitioner that any work release issues are
between petitioner and DOCS and not parole.
[Exhibit 7 to the petition at pps 7

&

8].

Nonetheless, in camera inspection of the parole file revealed that
it

contained

documents

relating

to

the

investigation

of

the

allegations against petitioner which resulted in the work release
revocation.
There is no question that performance as a participant in a
22

)

(

temporary release program is a factor to be considered by the
Parole Board in its parole release decision, Executive Law §259The

i(2) (c) (ii).

issue

here

is

whether

the

circumstances

surrounding the work release revocation can be considered where
petitioner has not had the opportunity to be heard.
)

The Parole Board cannot consider disciplinary violations
unless the prisoner was accorded the due process afforded him by
statute.

Collins v Hammock, 52 NY2d 798 (1980).

Nor may a parole

officer give information about alleged bad acts to a Parole Board
member ex parte.
Dept.

1979) .

People ex rel. Theil v Dillon, 70 AD2d 778 ( 4th

Here,

the work release revocation could not be

considered by the Parole Board until the revocation, which occurred
here

apparently

on

an

emergency

basis,

was

approved

by

the

temporary release committee or the superintendent in accordance
with NYCRR §1904.2.
Of course, this is not the appropriate proceeding in which to
attack the work

release revocation

its elf.

If

Quartararo

is

entitled to a hearing on the allegedly unsubstantiated charges
which, he claims, cost him his place in the work release program,
petitioner must pursue his administrative remedies through DOCS,
the agency which maintains the program.
I

do, however,

order that all documentation concerning the

work release revocation investigation be removed from the parole
23

l

file, unless in the interim, petitioner has had notice of the basis
of the revocation, and the opportunity for a hearing or review of
the determination in accordance with Correction Law §150 et seq.
and 7 NYCRR §1904.
Photographs

)

Petitioner also objects to inclusion of the photographs of the
victim

in

his

parole

file.

Presumably,

these

photographs

originated with the Suffolk County District Attorney because they
were

originally trial

exhibits.

A federal

judge has

already

commented on their misuse by the Suffolk County District Attorney
in the first trial, Quartararo v Fogg, supra, 679 F.Supp at 243,
where

the

pictures

were

used

to

inflame the

jury during

the

District Attorney's summation.
While it is true that the pictures are more likely to incite
jurors

than

to

affect Parole Board members,

who daily

review

serious crimes of parole applicants, what is of concern here is
the role the Suffolk County District Attorney is playing in this
parole review.

While it is clear that the District Attorney may

make recommendations regarding parole and it is appropriate for
the Parole Board to consider them, Confoy v New York State Division
of Parole, 173 AD2d 1014, 1015 (3rd Dept. 1991), this should not
be interpreted to mean thats/he may submit trial exhibits to the
Parole Board.

Accordingly the photographs should be removed from
24

l

{

the

parole

file

appropriate,

and

be

returned to the

or to the Supreme Court,

District Attorney

Suffolk County,

if

Criminal

Term.
As

for

petitioner's

circulation of

allegations

the photographs

concerning

at the

the

alleged

Queensboro Correctional

'\

Facility, they are more appropriately brought to the attention of
the Department of Correction or to the New York State Commission
of Investigation.
The cumulative effect of all of these errors leads to the
conclusion

that

the

Parole

Board

reviewed

substantial information not properly before it.

and

considered

In addition to the

Board's misconstrual of its role, the cumulative effect of these
errors:

considering

the

suppressed

confession,

the

first

conviction, press reports, and materials not appropriately in the
parole file, form another, independent basis to require reversal
and a remand.
CONCLUSION

The

petition

is

granted

to

the

extent

of

reversing

the

determination of respondent, which denied probation to petitioner,
and remanding this matter to the Parole Board to hold a de novo
hearing within 30 days of service of a copy of this decision and·
judgment on it.

The new hearing is to be held in accordance with

this decision and judgment.

Respondent has 30 days from the date
25

(

of the hearing to issue a

new determination.

If the parties

consent they may combine this rehearing with the upcoming parole
hearing.
All photographs of the victim and any other trial evidence
included in the parole file,
parole

file

within

ten

if any, are to be removed from the
1
All reports, memoranda, etc. ,
days.

regarding the work release revocation are also to be removed from
the parole file within ten days.

The results of the work release

revocation hearing, if held, may be included in the file.
This constitutes the decision and judgment of this court.

DATED: January

'3/

1994
Kristin Booth Glen

J.s.c.
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